Certificate presented by R. Adm. L. T. Du Bose, USN., to all hands participating in the "Sage of the Streamlined Bait". [image of map]
Track chart showing where "Streamlined Bait" Action took place off Formosa. If an historian would have to pick the most outstanding month for the Cabot, it would be I October 1944. Protecting the crippled cruisers U3S Canberra (CA 70) and the USS Houston (CC 81) off Formosa was an outstanding feat for our aviators. Admiral Halsey used us as "bait" to lure the Japanese Fleet to combat against the heart of the 3rd Fleet. Later in the month, the Cabot was to participate in the greatest sea battle of all-the Battle of Leyte Gulf. On 1 October, the Cabot was anchored in Ulithi Atoll and got underway on the 3rd because of a storm. A quartering sea rolled the ship so much, we lost six F6F's and one TBM over the side. Extensive damage to the ship was reported, and the only radio equipment in ~ 49 ~ working order was the TBS, VHF and NAN. J J. BIRD, S2c and C. F. KEILLY, ARM2c were injured in the storm, but returned to duty. The ship was underway again on 6 Oct. for a strike on Nansei Shoto, furnishing both CAP and ASP for the fleet. On 12 Oct., the fleet made a high-speed approach on Formosa and used AA fire to down a Betty. The enemy then harassed the fleet all night, dropping flares and sending search planes to attack. A sweep on 13 Oct. shot down one Topsy and strafed two Nicks and other Japanese planes on the ground. In addition, Cabot planes set fire to a hangar on Shinchito. Later, a fighter sweep was launched over Miyako Shima and damaged three Bettys on the ground. That afternoon, the USS Canberra was reported struck by a Japanese torpedo in the aft engine room. (This cruiser was the first American ship to be named for a foreign city-Canberra, Australia.) The Cabot was ordered to clear the disposition and form a separate Task Unit to protect the damaged Canberra. Japanese planes tried to finish her off, but out CAP shot down two Jills, two Tonys and damaged others. Later, the USS Houston was also torpedoed, and the Cabot was joined by the Cowpens to protect the two cruisers. One VF fighter piloted by Lt. (jg) Benjamin J. HARRISON did not return. At 1914 hours, a large Japanese plane, identified as a Betty approached the starboard beam and was taken under fire. The target was big, and the automatic weapons deadly accurate. The plane began to burn, and flames cast weird shadows on the deck as it passed over the ship. There was a tense moment as everyone wondered if it might fall on the ship, but the plane splashed into the water about 300 yards from the starboard quarter. The USS Houston was under tow by th USS Boston and later by the USS Pawnee, and the USS Munsee towed the Canberra. Task Unit 30.3.2 consisted of the Cabot, Cowpens, Wichita, Mobile and five destroyers, and operated north of the towing group to provide maximum protection. Enemy searchers were sent to try to locate the "cripples" and the two escorting carriers. The SK radar was nothing short of phenomenal; the Cahot was at times conducting intercepts of the missions when other ships had no radar indication at all. Fighter direction of the Cabot was excellent then and afterward and gained respect of other vessels operating with her. The towing and escorting groups became known as "the Streamlined Bait" because the commander of the 3rd Fleet expected to draw the Japanese out of hiding so we could wipe them out with one clean stroke. The anxiety was terrific as the next day unfolded. The speed of the towing group was about 4 knots on 16 Oct., and the position was about 75 miles east of Formosa. At 1325 hours, two large groups of enemy planes were spotted on radar about 70 miles away and coming from Formosa. The northern group was closing on a collision course while the southern group was on a parallel course about 50 miles away. The enemy jammed radar for five minutes, but stopped abruptly and the picture was clear: two fighter divisions from the Cabot were on CAP. A helpless feeling ran though everyone aboard and undoubtedly throughout the Task Group, as the raids were estimated to consist of about 60 planes each. All available fighters were launched im- mediately. The Cowpens planes took the group to the south-evidently intended to attack the towing group-and Cabot's planes went to help their friends who were rapidly closing in on the enemy, then about 60 miles off. At 1335 hours, the fighter director officer told the fighters, "Your target is at 12 o'clock five miles. Look up." At 1356 hours, the report was received, "Tallyho. Many, many bogies." The formation consisted of almost every kind of Japanese plane, and there were between 60 and 75 of them. It looked like the enemy had sent everything available to kill off our ships. Dive bombers and torpedo planes were in one group with the fighters above. It was suicidal for just eight fighters to attack that many planes, but they did. Radio traffic was almost at a garble when Lt. ~ 50 ~ FECKE broke in and ordered the chatter stopped. Only vital information could be sent on the radio. Immediate compliance by the fighters was almost unbelievable in the face of what was happening. Strict radio discipline, however, did save at least one man's life. On 16 Oct., two divisions of F6F planes were on CAP providing cover and protection for the damaged cruisers. The first division consisted of: Lt. Alfred J. FECKE Ens. Robert B. WILLIAMS Lt. (jg) Irl V. SONNER Ens. Robert L. BUCHANAN The second division included: Lt. Max G. BARNES Ens. Robert E. MURRAY Lt. (jg) Walter D. BISHOP Ens. Henry W. BALSIGER These Cabot fighter pilots were vectored out to intercept the approaching bogies estimated to contain 60-75 planes. The enemy wanted to finish off the crippled cruisers and thought they had enough force to do it. The Japanese planes consisted of about 25 Jills (torpedo planes), a formation of Vals (dive bombers), 20 Franceses (twin-engine medium bombers) and 20 Zekes (A6M Eighters). The Jills and Vals were at 9,000 feet while the Franceses were 500 feet above the torpedo planes. The Zekes were on top to provide cover. Lt. FECKE's division climbed to starboard to divert the enemy fighters, while Lt. BARNES's group rolled to port to attack the bombers. To help the eight American pilots, six more fighters were scrambled at 1330 hours and diverted west toward the enemy force. The pilots were: Lt. Willard E. EDER, air group commander Ens. Emeral B. COOK, his wingman Lt. Uncas L. FRETWELL, division leader Ens. Melvin COZZENS Ens. Bernard DUNN Ens. William H. TURNER Another division of VF 29 fighters were on antisnooper patrol, and were also diverted by the ship's FDO to join the other fighters. In this division were: Lt. Pleas E. GREENLEE Ens. James J. GILZEAN Lt. (jg) Glenn E. ELLSTROM Ens. Frank W. TROUP The first eight fighters to contact the enemy force shot down 27 planes with only one loss. Ens. WILLIAMS was hit in the right eye, and his oil tank was punctured by three Zekes. His engine quit, and he made a water landing. Two hours later, WILLIAMS was picked up by a Seagull (SOC) and returned to the Cabot via the USS Wichita. The later groups of fighters shot down six planes making the total 33. Historians have not saw fit to write much about this action, but considering, eight American pilots against approximately 70 enemy planes and destroying 27 of their aircraft to our one has to be among the most outstanding victories in U.S. Naval history. What's more, this remarkable feat was accomplished in less than 15 minutes, and three Cabot fighter pilots made "ace" on this day alone: Lt. Robert L. BUCHANAN, Lt. Alfred J. FECKE and Ens. Robert E. MURRAY. The Marianas Turkey Shoot a few months earlier got the media attention when 395 enemy planes were shot down in one day, but one must remember there were 15 fast carriers involved in that action. On 16 Oct. 1944, just one carrier - the Cabot - got 33 planes, of which 27 were downed in 15 short minutes! The pilots and their kills included: Ens. Robert L. BUCHANAN 5 Lt. Alfred J. FECKE 5 Ens. Robert E. MURRAY 5 Lt. (jg) Irl V. SONNER 4 Lt. Walter D. BISHOP 3 Ens. Henry W. BALSIGER 2 Ens. William H. TURNER 2 Lt. Max G. BARNES 2 Ens. Robert B. WILLIAMS 1 Lt. Uncas L. FRETWELL 1 Ens. Melvin COZZENS 1 Ens. Bernard DUNN 1 Lt. Pleas E. GREENLEE 1 ~ 51 ~ Continuing the "Streamlines Bait" Action off Formosa: The southern raid orbited as soon as the northern group was attacked and the Cowpens planes were dispatched. Twelve Japanese "Kates" were forming to attack the towing group. The American raiders shot down nine enemy aircraft, three broke away and pressed the attack home, but were shot down by anti- aircraft fire from the towing group. At the same time, USS Houston received another torpedo hit. The large group of enemy planes retreated to Formosa. The "Bait" was as happy to see them leave as they must have been to get out. 16 Oct. was indeed a memorable day for Ens. R. J. MAGHAN and the Cabot. The pilot, from Brainerd, Minn., was flying the monotonous antisubmarine patrol in an Avenger (TBM) over the disposition when two fighters chased a Zeke in front of MAGHAN. He turned slightly, lined up the target and reported, "Splash one Zeke." Returning to the ship, MAGHAN just said, "He got in my way." (VT 29) Aviation Action reports record this plane as a Tojo-the Japanese pilot parachuted out dressed in a black flying suit, but appeared dead in the water.) Many congratulatory messages were sent to the Cabot afterwards, including tributes from Admirals Nimitz and Halsey. Cripple Division I (CriDiv) performed one of the most outstanding achievements in saving damaged ships. All men involved were given an unofficial certificate, "Society of Streamlined Bait" for their action off Formosa. Early on 20 Oct., the Cabot was detached from Task Unit 30.3 with the salutation, "Your excellent cooperation and highly credible performance during your recent operation is greatly appreciated. Good luck." Cabot was reassigned to Task Group 38.2 and rendezvoused and rejoined that morning. Upon arrival, the USS Independence sent the message, "Salutations to the return of the wandering hero." The Task Group commander in his message said, "Understand you carried message to Garcia. Welcome home." And from the USS Hoggatt Bay, assigned to I take over the escorting job, the following was received: "Message for captain. Feel just like a Wave. Have released a man to fight." Task Group 38.2 operated east of the Visayan Islands on 21 Oct. to support troop landings there. The Task Group also searched for the Japanese Fleet, but was unsuccessful after a 300-mile radius was covered. Strikes from the Cabot worked over Cebu airfield, strafing and bombing available targets. Ens. Lyle E. EASTLING's Hellcat was hit by AA fire, and he crash landed on the USS Intrepid. The Famous Battle of Leyte Gulf The Battle of Leyte Gulf is still regarded as the greatest in the history of naval warfare. It involved every type of ship including aircraft carriers, battleships, submarines, cruisers, destroyers and PT boats. Without doubt, this battle will be discussed for generations, but what made it so important was that it finished the Japanese Fleet as a serious foe, thus shortening the war in the Pacific, which ended within a year. Between 23 and 26 Oct., a series of crucial surface and air battles took place. The aim of the Japanese Fleet (Center, Southern, Northern Forces) was to stop Gen. MacArthur's landings on Leyte in the Philippines. They knew if they lost these Islands they had lost the War. Action #1 In the Sibuyan Sea The Center Force's mission was to proceed through the Sibuyan Sea through San Bernardino Strait, turn south, and destroy the American troops that had landed on Leyte. A Cabot plane spotted this Force which had several battleships and reported this to the Third Fleet. Planes from the Third Fleet attacked the Japs and thought they had damaged them to the extent that they would retreat. We did sink the Musashi but the rest were able to fight, they did turn back, but later resumed their mission. Over optimistic reports from our pilots convinced Halsey that he could leave this Force and find the Carriers. ~ 52 ~ Action #2 In the Mindanao Sea The Southern Force of Admiral Nishimura and Admiral Shima entered the Mindanao Sea that night with the intentions of steaming through Surigao Strait and also hit the troops on Leyte. They were ambushed by the Seventh Fleet under Admiral Kincaid and totally destroyed. Action #3 Battle off Samar When Kurita broke out through the San Bernardino Strait into the Philippine Sea he met a force of small escort carriers which were no match for his large battleships. He could have completely destroyed them and proceeded to Leyte but at the last minute he turned around and missed the best opportunity of the Japanese Navy to set the War back many months. Action #4 Battle off Cape Engano Adm. Halsey did not know the carriers to the north were acting as decoys to pull his Third Fleet north so Kurita could break out. He went after them and sunk a number of the carriers and could have sunk the entire Force except he was ordered back south when the situation became desperate at San Bernardino Strait. Our sister ship USS Princeton (CVL 23) was sunk in the battle-the first and only CVL sunk in the war (and the only fast carrier sunk after the Hornet (CV 8) sank on 26 Oct. 1942). On 21 Oct., Cabot was steaming along with TG 38.2 enroute to strike the Visayans (inner Philippine Islands). Our CAP shot down a Zero and a Jake on 24 Oct. Ens. Jimmy VAN I FLEET exploded a Betty after it was reported in the area by Lt. John BALLENTINE, TBM pilot. At 0825 hours, the Task Group commander sighted four Japanese battleships, eight cruisers and 13 destroyers seven miles from the southern tip of Mindoro. This was Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's Center Force trying to clear San Bernardino Strait and swing south to destroy invading forces on Leyte. First contact with the powerful Japanese Center Force was in Tablas Strait east of Mindoro. Planes from the Intrepid (CV ll) and Cabot found them a little past 0800 hours on the 24th. Fighting Hellcats from the Cabot flew cover at 14,000 feet and at 16,000 feet for the torped planes. The Avengers from Cabot were directed to attack the leading battleship from the starboard side. Lt. FECKE, Lt. THOMPSON, Lt. (jg) SONNER and Ens. BUCHANAN strafed enemy ships. Then Ens. COZZENS, Lt. FRETWELL, Ens. DUNN and Ens. TURNER strafed other Japanese ships in the group. Lt. WILLIAMS and his crew members James E. BOLAND, AOM2c and B. L. RACZYNSKI, AEMlc made a water landing and were seen waving from their rubber raft. Lt. McPHERSON led the TBM attack with Lt. ANDERSON and Lt. (jg) SKIDMORE in an attack on the leading Japanese battleships. However, Cabot's shining hour of the battle came when she helped sink one of the world's largest battleships Japan's Musashi. The Sinking of the Super Battleship Musashi 24 Oct. would have been a red letter date for the Cabot anyway, as she fought hard for control of Leyte Gulf. But as the day further unfolded, she was to help sink the Musashi, one of the two largest battleships in the world. (The other, Japan's Yamato, would also be sunk with Cabot's help on 7 April 1945 off the coast of Japan.) The Cabot logs of 24 Oct. 1944 credit VT-29 with a torpedo hit on the Fuso-class battleship and a Kongo-class BB. (She can take credit for hits on the Kongo and the Musashi, but not on the Fuso-class-Fuso and Yamashiro-as they were not attacked by TG 38.2 planes. These latter two battleships were sunk on 25 Oct. 1944 by our battleships in Surigao Strait. During the war, many mistakes in identification were made. Pilots had to drop bombs or torpedos in the face of intense AA fire and had few seconds to count masts or gun turrets for positive ID.) Lt. (jg) Howard SKIDMORE, a torpedo pilot, was in the first attack on the Japanese Center Force along with other TBMs and F6Fs. ~ 53 ~ He made his run on the lead battleship, flanked by enemy cruisers and dropped his "fish". Then, his main concern was to get out of the heavy AA fire. He did take a direct hit on the starboard side of his aircraft, leaving a hole big enough to see the ocean below. He then flew into a path of tracer bullets from a cruiser, but jammed his stick forward and managed to take only a couple more hits. Someone from the Air Group radioed that a TBM was on fire. SKIDMORE didn't smell smoke, so he thought it was someone else. (Forty years later, his turret gunner, Don HAMBIDGE, told him it was his plane.) Danny McCarthy, the radioman, was hit by fragments of a five-inch shell from the battleship, but HAMBIDGE was able to give him first aid. Because of the wounded crewman, the TBM was allowed to land on the Cabot before other returning planes. With oil on the windshield, SKIDMORE could barely see the landing signal officer, but he did land safely with only three feet to spare from the port catwalk. His torpedo could have hit either the Musashi or the Yamato, he wasn't sure. Another attack from the Cabot was made in the afternoon with two divisions of Hellcat fighter pilots including Lt. Edward VAN VRANKEN, Ens. Francis COLLINS, Lt. (jg) Joseph CHANDLER, Ens. Robert JANDA, Lt. Max BARNES, Ens. Robert MURRAY, Ens. Henry W. BALSIGER and Ens. Emeral B. COOK. Bombs were dropped, and presumably much damage was done to the enemy, but positive identifications could not be made. Another Avenger was missing after the raid with Ens. Donald LAMPSON Jr. and crewmen William H. ODOM, ARM3c and Albert A. GRANGER, AMMH1c. Meanwhile, Admiral Halsey was making what many historians consider a grave error: he left the San Bernardino Strait unguarded, and the enemy came through on the 24th. Halsey was told that this fleet had turned back due to heavy damage. He knew there had to be Japanese carriers in the area, so he left this action believing the 7th Fleet could thwart an advance by the Center Force if they decided to return through the strait. The Japanese carriers Halsey so desperately wanted were commanded by Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa and were to the north, being used as decoys to pull Halsey away from the strait. This would enable Admiral Kurita to come through, swing south and let his super battleships halt the Leyte invasion. All Kurita had in his way was a group of CVEs, some destroyers and destroyer escorts. His battleships could have annihilated them, proceeded on south and set the war back many months. But for unknown reasons, Kurita let the opportunity slip. He thought the CVEs were the fast carriers of the 3rd Fleet. He turned back into the strait, and this part of the battle was over. Kurita's decision is hard to understand. At times, the Japanese were so willing to commit suicide to destroy their foe. At other times, they were over cautious to the point of letting us out of a corner. At any rate, this was one of those times for which we can be thankful. Halsey found the northern force under Ozawa. It was really a suicide mission, and he destroyed most of the carriers except the two hybrids that escaped. Halsey could have destroyed the whole fleet, but he was ordered by Nimitz to turn south for the breakout of Kurita at San Bernardino Strait. At 1110 hours, 25 Oct., Admiral Halsey turned around to intercept the retreating Japanese ships. This was described as one of the saddest days of his long naval career, as he recorded in this dairy, "C/C 180°", meaning change course due south and away from the northern Japanese force" - just when he had them under his guns. At the same time-1110 hours-the Cabot was on her way to intercept Kurita's withdrawing surface units. Strikes were made and one VT did not return. Lt. (jg) C. F. NORTON and crewmen L. M. SVIBEN, ARM2c and A. R. PATON, AOM3c were aboard the Avenger. They were later picked up by Philippine natives and returned to the ship via Leyte. During the three days of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the enemy lost 305,710 tons of ships, in- ~ 54 ~ cluding four carriers, three battleships, 10 cruisers and nine destroyers. In contrast, we lost 36,600 tons including the Princeton, two escort carriers, two destroyers and a destroyer escort. In addition, both sides lost hundreds of aircraft, but the ratio was the usual nine to one in favor of us. On 28 Oct., the Cabot was covering the invasion of the Philippines. A sweep over Luzon netted an Oscar, a Zeke and a probable Tojo. Lt. H. E. LESLIE was hit by AA fire, and he made a forced landing in Laguna De Bay, a large lake near Manila Bay. LESLIE was seen climbing into his rubber boat near some sampans. A later inspection by fellow pilots revealed only an oil slick and the sampans. Ens. S. DEATH was also believed to be forced down in the Philippine invasion. Strikes made over Clark Field on 29 Oct. resulted in destroyed buildings and planes. The Task Force reported an enemy plane crashed the USS Intrepid. At 1858 hours on 29 Oct., a fighter crashed on the Cabot's deck, killing Lt. (jg) H. M. WAGSTAFF Jr. The fighter's pilot, Ens. E. B. COOK, was severely burned and later died. WAGSTAFF's and COOK's remains were committed to the deep at 1315 hours on 30 Oct. at latitude 15°55.2" north, longitude 125°38.2" east. While on CAP, Ens. Robert B. WILLIAMS and Lt. (jg) Irl V. SONNER splashed a Frances. On 4 Nov., Cabot was steaming in company with Task Group 38.2 east of Luzon and made strikes on the island. At 1232 hours on 5 Nov., Thomas M. JONES, ACMM, was struck and killed by an airplane propeller while starting an engine. His remains were committed to the deep at latitude 14 deg 54.8" north, longitude 128 deg 44.S" east. Lt. Paul ASHLEY, one of three doctors aboard at the time, tells of this tragedy. "One morning during general quarters, and while the Cabot was launching antisubmarine patrol, a man got in the way of a propeller. He was slashed in the back and brought to the operating room and asked if anything hurt. "He replied, 'no, but I feel a little cold and ~ 51 ~ something wet on my back." Dr. ASHLEY slid his hand under him and realized the man's spine was cut completely in half. He was given plenty of morphine and died in about three hours. The Cabot proceeded on 9 Nov. to Ulithi Atoll and anchored there. The following changes were made in the complement: - 9 Nov.-Cmdr. Herman P. SCARNEY, MCV(S) reported on board for duty as senior medical officer. - 10 Nov.-Ens. Henry W. LOWE reported aboard for duty involving fighter direction and CIC operations. Cmdr. H. A. BLAISDELL, MC-V(S) was transferred off ship via USS Belleau Wood. - 14 Nov.-Richard SPRINGER, GM2c was transferred off ship. The Cabot was underway on 14 Nov. with strikes over Manila. On 19 Nov., Lt. J. H. BALLANTINE Jr. and crewmen W. K. BIYE, AOM2c and W. J. HESSE, ARM3c were missing in a TBM that was part of a strike leveling buildings and destroying planes. ~ 55 ~ [picture map - Battle of Leyte Gulf Oct 23-25, 1944] MAP NO. 1
Chart (above) prepared by Navy cartographers and artists illustrates basic details of phase of second battle of Philippines. ~ 56 ~ [picture map - Battle of Leyte Gulf 24 Oct. 1944] MAP NO. 2
Map (above) gives the details of Jap's unsuccessful counterpunch. Is based on early reports from the battle scene. ~ 57 ~ (end of Chapter 6) ======== . CHAPTER SEVEN THE KAMIKAZE ATTACK and RELATED STORIES Nov.-Dec. 1944 By November 1944, the Japanese High Command knew they had lost the war. Only a miracle could save their nation from unconditional surrender, but the "miracles" that might save them was the kamikaze (meaning "divine wind") pilots, the kaiten or one-man suicide boat, and the baka (meaning "fool") flying bomb released from a Betty. Thousands of Japanese soldiers and sailors were willing to die and possibly cause the U.S. Navy such losses that we might settle for a negotiated peace. Indeed, nothing in our naval history had caused such fear as an enemy willing to crash into ships. It was beyond the American comprehension to imagine a man willing to commit suicide this way, and it was hard for the bluejacket to adjust to this threat. The Navy was worried because losses were mounting. They needed a proper defense - if there was one - to stop it. The Navy censored all information about the effect suicide missions were having because they did not want the enemy to know how concerned we were. The American public was not told about the kamikaze until the day President Roosevelt died-13 April 1945. As hoped, the kamikaze made the back pages of most newspapers, leaving page one for coverage of Roosevelt. Primary targets of the kamikaze were fast carriers because their wooden flight decks were very vulnerable. The bomb would usually penetrate the deck and explode below, causing far more damage than if it exploded on deck. In response, the U.S. was developing armored flight decks for the new Midway-class carriers, but the war was over before they were ready. On 25 Nov. 1944, kamikazes attacked the Task Force. Gene MASUCCI, QMlc was on the bridge as quartermaster of the watch while Ole LANGSTED, QM2c was at the wheel. The Cabot deck log of 25 Nov. reads: "1254-Enemy plane (Zeke) dove on ship, hitting flight deck at frame 26 port side starting fire and causing extensive damage. " 1256-Second Zeke made dive on ship, hitting close aboard on port quarter, exploding under mount 6. Results of crashes: 2 six-foot ~ 59 ~ holes in flight deck vicinity frame 25: six-foot hole on 03 deck frame 25; #2 gun tub and surrounding catwalk carried away; catapult out of commission with electrical control system destroyed; port after radio antennas out of commission; forward port gasoline system carried away; port side of hangar deck space from amidship to frame 60 riddled with shrapnel, damaging many aviation spares stowed in hangar; vent ducts and uptakes punctured; fire main riser riddled, with six-foot section of fire main out; forward fire pump out." In Ernie Pyle's book, Last Chapter, the episode is described by Lt. Howard SKIDMORE, who was seated in his TBF. SKIDMORE had been ready to take off when his plane was clipped by the Japanese suicider, shearing off the TBF propeller. Said Pyle, "SKIDMORE wasn't scratched, and the close explosion didn't even deafen him or give him a headache. " Here's SKIDMORE's version of the day: "A large air strike on Luzon was taking off-16 fighters and eight torpedo bombers had been launched, with one TBF left. My plane, with a crew of Don HAMBIDGE and Danny McCARTHY, was the last to be catapulted. "Noticing the gunners firing aft, I saw two enemy aircraft flying low, crossing the Cabot's wake from starboard to port. Shortly after passing the wake of the Intrepid, the second plane did a 'right wingover' and dove into the Intrepid. By this time, there were many enemy planes flying in, around and over the formation. "Just as I had taxied onto the catapult and was hooking up for the shot, the Task Force commander ordered all carriers to cease launching and turn starboard. I was not ordered to cut my engine, but I had slowed down the prop to a low RPM. "By the sound of the 40MM and 20MM, I knew the enemy planes were close. I positioned myself in front of my armor plate, lowered my seat and adjusted my gear to give me as much protection as possible. The next thing I knew, I was sitting in a flaming furnace. I ordered my ------------------------------------------------ *Last Chapter, Ernie Pyle, (Henry Holt & Co., 1946.) ------------------------------------------------ crew out and climbed out on the starboard side onto the flight deck. "The kamikaze had crashed just ahead on the port side of the TBF. The bomb had exploded and the plane was burning. I ran aft through heavy smoke to a catwalk and ducked onto an ammo storage room when I heard the gunners open up again. "Another Japanese plane was shot down close to the Cabot. It crashed into the port side amidship at the waterline, with much damage and loss to the gun crews." Added SKIDMORE, "No doubt in my mind-The kamikaze had me in his sights and came close enough to knock off my prop and hub as he passed over." The kamikaze, who crashed through the flight deck, exploded in the catapult room, knocking a hole in the port side large enough to drive a Jeep through. "Luckily," said SKIDMORE, "I had the protection of the TBF, even though it was loaded with four 500-pound bombs in the bomb bay. Shrapnel from the enemy aircraft struck the port wing underside and the fuselage. My helmet was charred on top, some hair singed, and all my fingers on my left hand had blistered from the heat while I was in the cockpit. I was very lucky; 35 of our shipmates were killed by these two kamikazes." Killed that day were: Salvatore ANDREWS, S2c Gerald G. BENNETT, QM2c Gerald M. BIEDERMAN, S2c Everett H. DAGGER, BMlc Hjalmar M. DAVIDSON, AMM2c Raymond A. JOHNSON, GM3c Sgt. Major L. J. CAMP, USMC Those blown overboard and missing in action were; Lt. John T. WHEELER Ens. Frank J. LYONS Jason L. AUSTIN Jr., PhoM2c Samuel E. AXTELL, Slc James F. CLARK, Slc Howard R. EVANS, Slc Louis A. GUSLINE, S2c Ray GRYZB, S2c James A. JONES, Slc ~ 60 ~ William KADAR, Slc Clement V. LAVIN, S2c Ceaser C. LEONELLO, S2c John E. MADDEN, S2c Arthur G. MARTINEZ, S2c James E. MERRELL Jr., S2c Robert R. METZ, S2c Francis X. McGEE, S2c Ramond N. MICHAUD, GM3c Richard D. MOORE, Slc Robert F. FITZGERALD, Slc George H. MORTON, Jr., S2c Bill C. NELSON, GM3c Ulyssess S. NONEMACHER, Slc Joseph F. PIEJA, S2c Henry M. PUCKE1T, GM3c Raymond N. SKEY, Slc Leonard J. STICKLER, GM3c Francis L. TUKE, Cox Total men lost from the kamikaze attack 35. On 28 Nov., the following were transferred to the USS Samaritan, a hospital ship. All would later receive the Purple Heart: Richard ARCHER, Slc Franklin C. ATKINS, Slc Francis A. BALLOUZ, PhM2c Peter T. BROWN, Slc Robert E. CRONIN, Slc Kenneth L. DICKEY, Slc James E. FRENCH, AMM2c Rene GRODIS, S2c Paul A. McDONALD Jr., Slc Joseph D. ROBERTS, Slc Manuel J. SUARES, S2c Charles W. TAYLOR, GM2c Reginald A. WHEELER, CY Edward T. BURRELL, Sgt. USMC William P. EISELE, Pfc. USMC Frank D. FABRIZIO, Pfc. USMC Charles S. SMITH, Pfc. USMC Dozens of awards were given by the captain to of officers and men who repaired the Cabot and kept her in the fight. One Lt. (jg) Earl HOEY, the hangar deck executive officer, repaired more than 94 holes in the hull and was awarded the Bronze Star for his efforts. Another Bronze Star was awarded Jesse L. SISK, BMlc, "For heroic service as mount captain on board the USS Cabot in action against enemy Japanese forces off the coast of the Philippines on 25 Nov. 1944." In addition, SISK was authorized to wear the Combat "V" on his Bronze Star ribbon. Read the citation, "After most of his gun crew had been forced to seek refuge from the intense heat of an explosion during an attack by Japanese aircraft, SISK personally took charge of the gun and by manning various posts about the gun which enabled it to resume firing, took under fire two enemy planes attempting to strafe the vessel. His courage and devotion to duty in the face of grave hazards were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. " It would be the last carrier strike in support of Leyte, but the Japanese had known we were coming. One kamikaze hit the Essex and the Hancock, another the Intrepid. The Cabot caught two. Clearly, something had tipped off the enemy, and this bothered Admiral Halsey. It was later learned that our radio traffic pattern was the problem. From then on, radio patterns were varied, enabling our fleet to surprise the Japanese in later actions. Perhaps the best observation of the two kamikaze hits that day, though, are from Lt. Frank A ZIMANSKI, the gunnery officer. "I vividly recall many details of that attack," he said. "We were at general quarters. The first plane appeared dead astern, two to three miles and closing very fast. It was horizontal at an altitude of about 100 feet. He seemed to be attached to a high wire strung to the center of our flight deck. "We fired at him for a long time with the few guns aft that could bear directly astern, but he kept right on coming. "With such an approach, he had but one target - our island superstructure - yet he never modified his course to the right a few degrees to accomplish that. I surmised later that he must have been dead or disabled," ZIMANSKI recalled. "I stood precisely at his level in the open gun control station when he reached the island, and ~ 61 ~ I peered intently into his cockpit. I was about 50 feet away, and his wing tip was almost within reach, but at his speed, he was no more than a blur. "Then I recall how we suddenly became engulfed in flame, smoke and debris. We instinctively ducked until it all passed over in a few seconds. "I later discovered tiny sear spots on my shirt from hot oil. Evidently, the left wing of the kam had snagged a TBF on our catapult ready for launching. "The kamikaze then pitched into our port gun tube, where his bomb exploded. That caused most of our casualties. The guns and men were lost in the water. We buried many the next day with all honors. (Had the pilot not snagged our TBF, he would have continued his flight off the forward ramp where he was headed.)" Continued ZIMANSKI, "Recognizing the distraction of the explosion on our gunners as well as the probability of future attacks, I repeatedly directed all stations, 'Guard your sectors! Guard your sectors! "Sure enough, within a moment, a second kam appeared slightly to the left of dead ahead. He made a similar low-level attack, also aimed at our island. Only a few hundred yards from us, he suddenly lost control, banked sharply right and crashed alongside to port beneath the Marines' 20MM battery, where more casualties were sustained. "In retrospect, the Japanese attack was well conceived and executed-a tribute to them indeed. Fortunately, our gunners defeated them by thwarting them in their objective to knock the Cabot out of the war. "I am convinced that after the first kam struck us, only our forward #1 40MM mount remained in position to bear on the second kam and defend us. In this, they miraculously succeeded. "Many of us were no more than five seconds from Eternity when Lt. 'Red' EADER and his gallant crew shot down the second kam. Many of us live on borrowed time, thanks to them. We remain forever, if belatedly, grateful." Said ZIMANSKI, "We of the Cabot have much to reflect on and contemplate. Recall that it wasn't long before this kamikaze attack that the Cabot was only a moment away from a gruesome and cataclysmic fate when the wild errant heavy cruiser, traveling at high speed, threatened to cut us literally in two. "It is perfectly clear to me that only our Divine Lord could have and did spare us on those two occasions. Why? Well, to ponder it is in vain. The answer is beyond any mortal. "Finally, let me say that I have long felt obliged to make such an acknowledgment. To neglect such an obligation on my part would have put me in the same category with those nine lepers in Luke's Gospel. They were mercifully healed by our Lord Jesus, yet who never returned to thank Him. I feel like the 10th leper in that Gospel who also was spared on the same occasion. He did return to Jesus and thanked Him." Frank A. ZIMANSKI, gunnery officer, 1944 Captain, U.S. Navy (retired) Still another member of Cabot's crew, Fred DUDLEY, AOMlc, remembers that fateful day of 25 Nov. "We were at battle stations during general quarters. My station was the port belting room, almost directly across the flight deck from the island. (The room previously had been used-to- belt 50-caliber ammo for guns on the fighter planes. But for several months we had begun to receive this ammunition already belted.) "While in the room, I felt a tremendous shock and heard a violent explosion. I stepped through the hatch and up a short ladder to the catwalk below and outside the flight deck to see if there was anything I could do. "Immediately," DUDLEY recalls, "I noticed that a 40MM gun tub battery was miss-ing-gone. While standing there, I saw another kamikaze approaching at about 10 o'clock. The Marine 20MM guns were pouring everything they had at him and were scoring as you could see by the tracer rounds. But he kept coming. "Thoughts raced through one's mind at a time like that, and my first thought was that I didn't have a weapon of any kind...not a rifle, side arm, not even a bean shooter, and this I ~ 62 ~ remember, was very frustrating because I would like to have thrown something at the enemy. This guy was trying to sink my ship. "Realizing there was nothing I could do to help stop him, my next thought was that he was coming straight at me standing there on the catwalk over the water. No, what he was attempting to do was take out the island and I was in the path, so I decided to duck back in the port belting room. "Having my helmet and life preserver on, I planted my head firmly against the bulkhead and held on to the ammunition belting steel table hoping to minimize the shock of explosion and keep myself from bouncing around on the deck. "Then it happened. The Jap had finally lost control and banked into port side below the Marines 20MM gun tub, killing some of the men. "I got up off the deck and ran back to the catwalk. There was a 7-to 8-inch hole in the grillwork where I had been standing. The Marine sergeant, obviously wounded, was sitting on the flight deck. I tried to help him, but he refused any assistance until all his men were taken care of. He died a short while later." After the kamikaze hits, the Cabot stayed in the fight and struck Neilson Field, destroying Japanese planes and an oiler. However, action on 25 Nov. wasn't over yet. A VF crashed on deck at 1621 hours and went over the starboard side. The pilot, Ens. W. H. TURNER, was not found by the destroyer that searched for him. He had been hit by AA fire on his port elevator, which contributed to his fatal landing. On 26 Nov., funeral services were held and the following were buried at sea: Salvatore ANDREWS, S2c Gerald BENNETT, QM2c Everett H. DAGGER, BMlc Sgt. Mgr. L. J. CAMP, USMC Rayond A. JOHNSON, GM3c Two men killed 25 Nov. on board ship had been buried immediately. The rest of the casualties were blown overboard and never recovered. Admiral Halsey made an official call on the Cabot on 30 Nov. at Ulithi. Although it can- not be substantiated, it is believed Halsey recommended the Cabot for a Presidential Unit Citation then. Later, the Cabot did receive the citation, the highest award to be given a ship. While at anchor in Ulithi, several personnel changes took place. On 3 Dec., Lt. E. J. LANGHURST, athletic director was transferred off for another assignment. W. W. BLACKINGTON, S2c was transferred to the USS Solace for medical treatment. He returned on 9 Dec. Several Marine privates reported on board 4 Dec. to replace those killed or injured in the kamikaze attack. They were: Dan Y.VARLOW, Robert BATEY, Calvin BOYER, James H. CAROTHERS and Charles E. COCHRAN. It should be pointed out, however, that all the actions the Cabot was involved in during her 16 months at sea, none stand out for the crew more vividly than the "K" attacks of 25 Nov. 1944. The Japanese had gambled that desperate tactics such as the kamikaze attacks would change the outcome of the war, but they did not count on the courage of American sailors. The suicide missions did not work then any more than they do today in the Middle East. It just makes Americans more determined to protect our way of life in the greatest country on earth. Thirty-five men gave their lives on 25 Nov. 1944 to protect our principles. Let no American forget their sacrifices. President John F. Kennedy expressed what every Cabot veteran feels when he said: "Any man who may be asked In this century what he did to make his life worth while, I think I can respond with a good deal of pride and satisfaction: I served in the United States Navy." ~ 63 ~ [map]
The Cabot, Intrepid, Hancock and Essex were all hit by Suicides on 25 Nov. 1944 [picture]
Salvage and repair party at work at a bomb site 25 Nov. 1944 ~ 64 ~ [picture]
The Lone TBM (Avenger) Torpedo Plane burns on the flight deck after a Japanese suicide attack. [picture]
Damage to Catapult Room of the Cabot ~ 65 ~ [picture]
Bomb hole on Flight Deck [illustration] [illustration Thanksgiving Menu]
This was the last Thanksgiving for many of the brave Cabot Crewmen as the Kamikazies hit the ship two days later. ~ 66 ~ [picture]
Putting out fire caused by Japanese suicide plane [picture]
Jap plane diving on the Cabot 25 Nov. 44 ~ 67 ~ [picture]
Cabot after Jap suicide plane crashed close to port (Note lone TBM on flight deck catapult) [picture]
The crewman who almost had his arm amputated recuperates in sick bay as the Captain pins the Purple Heart on the man. See Dr. Paul Ashley's story in Appendix. ~ 68 ~ (end of chapter 8) ====================== . CHAPTER EIGHT The "BIG TYPHOON" AND HALSEY'S THRUST INTO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA December 1944 - February 1945 The next scheduled operation before landing on Luzon was to be MacArthur's assault on Mindoro starting 15 Dec. Because the island was close to Luzon, it was particularly important to maintain tight control over the Luzon airfield to avoid interference with the general's forces and supply ships coming up from Leyte. The Army was now in position to keep the peace south of Manila, but everything north of the city was the responsibility of Task Force 38. The Cabot was underway on 11 Dec. in company with TG 38.2 and struck Luzon on 14 Dec. Lt. J. F. THOMPSON was hit by AA fire south of San Palac Point and reported missing. Two F6Fs were also missing, piloted by Lt. (jg) Walter D. BISHOP and Ens. G. E. RECORDS. They collided midair while flying cover over airfields near Subic Bay. Both were seen in parachutes after the collision. The next day, Cabot pilots were attracted by a flashing mirror from the beach. They also saw "Cabot" written in the sand and spotted two white men and several natives waving to the planes. (Lt. BISHOP apparently did not survive but RECORDS did. Further information about the incident could not be found.) On 15 Dec., a faulty engine forced a VT plane to make a water landing with Lt. (jg) C. F. NORTON and crewmen A. R. PATON, AOM2c and R. F. SMITH, ACRM. SMITH, picked up by the USS Swanson (DD 443), turned into sick bay with hand and foot lacerations. The fighters and torpedo planes from Air Group 29 hit the Florida Blanca area and inflicted much damage, including destruction of an ammo dump. The Avengers were carrying I four 500 pound GP bombs each and the Hellcats one 1,000 pound bomb each. A big storm approached the 3rd Fleet on the 17th, and heavy seas prevented refueling. The Devastating Typhoon of December 1944 An account by Hanson W. Baldwin entitled "When the Third Fleet Met 'The Great Typhoon"' in The New York Times Magazine of 16 Dec. 1951 describes the storm in almost biblical style, as the article began: "It was the greatest fleet that had ever ~ 69 ~ sailed the seas, and it was fresh from its greatest triumph. But the hand of God was laid upon it and a great wind blew, and it was scattered and broken upon the ocean...more men lost, more ships sunk and damaged than in many of the engagements of the Pacific war." Certainly the fleet was trying to dodge the typhoon on the 18th, but could not find the right course. The seas became mountainous and every ship was in trouble. A man in the water could be heard yelling for help from the Cabot's bridge, but could not be seen due to the driving rain and heavy seas. Life rings and smoke floats were dropped overboard to help. Our sister ships, the CVLs, were experiencing more problems due to heavy rolling and loose aircraft. The Monterey (CVL 26) and USS Cowpens (CVL 25) had hanger deck fires. The Langley (CVL 27) reported a roll at 70°, and the San Jacinto (CVL 30) had planes adrift on the hangar deck. A young ensign by the name of Gerald Ford lost his footing on the flight deck of the Monterey and slid across it. He did manage to hang on to a short rail until the ship righted herself. Ens. Ford later became our 38th president. The Cabot pitched and rolled heavily, but she was well buttoned up and very well prepared for the storm. Countless times it seemed the Cabot would capsize, and at one particularly bad moment, Capt. MICHAEL made light of it by saying to the helmsman, "Watch it son, or we'll go into a snap roll." Cabot weathered the storm well, though, and all hands breathed easier when the sea calmed. The Task Group commander complimented the Cabot with, "Congratulations on handling a tough situation. " The only reference on the ship's log was at 1600 hours on 18 Dec: "Mustered the crew on stations due to possibility of having lost personnel over the side due to heavy weather...Absentees none." The Monterey had three men killed and 10 more critically injured. The San Jacinto fought to stay afloat, but there were no fatalities. However, three destroyers were lost: USS Hull (DD 350), USS Spence (DD 512) and USS Managhan (DD 354). Adding to the disaster were 790 men dead and 100 planes lost. Historians have blamed Admiral Halsey and the inexperienced young officers commanding the destroyers for most of the losses. The next two days, the fleet conducted a search and rescue mission, and about 100 men were picked up. The search ended the 22nd, and the fleet returned to Ulithi. Still more bad-luck struck on 20 Dec., when Ens. Robert WILLIAMS crashed into the bar- rier. He suffered a fractured skull and shock. The Cabot's log while anchored at Ulithi reports: - "26 Dec. '44-Francis D. DOUGHTERY, GM2c and Raymond C. MILLER, SKDlc were transferred to USS Hollandia for further transportation to the USA. Jesse 'L' SISK, BMlc transferred to the USS General S. K. Sturgis for transportation to the USA. "29 Dec. '44-Lt. Harry F. WHITMAN reported on board as CIC officer. Lt. John D. HALL (MC) transferred to the USS Samaritan for medical treatment." In support of the Lingayen, Luzon operation, the 3rd Fleet fast carrier Task Force made a thrust into the South China Sea. The main goal was to destroy any major Japanese units there. Cabot's log records the ship steaming in company with TG 38.1, and entering the South China Sea at 0010 hours 10 Jan. On 12 Jan., VT#8 was missing with pilot J. P. WALKER and crewmen Lester COMPTON, ARM3c and W. F. HOLT, AOM3c. Air strikes on 12 Jan. were made on the coast between Saigon and Camranh, destroying much shipping. One enemy convoy was entirely wiped out, and two others were severely mauled. The tally-41 ships sunk and 31 damaged. One hundred twelve enemy planes were destroyed while docks, oil storages and airfield facilities were heavily damaged. Air opposition had been negligible. Formosa was struck on the 15th, while fighter sweeps and searches were made to Amoy, Swatow, Hong Kong and Hainan. The 3rd Fleet was thrust into waters the enemy had until now ~ 70 ~ considered their own. Some 3,800 miles were crossed in the South China Sea with no battle damage to out ships. No enemy aircraft had been able to approach the fast carrier task forces closer than 20 miles. On 19 Jan., Ens. Herbert GIDNEY Jr. and Norman SOKOLOW, ARM3c reported for duty. Al 2230 hours, the Cabot cleared Balimang Channel, leaving the South China Sea and entered the Philippine Sea again. Thus, Cabot was the first American carrier in the South China Sea and the last one out. Admiral Halsey was especially wanting to find the two hybird carriers-Ise and Hyuga-that had escaped him in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. He had a special dislike for these converted carrier battleships and unfortunately for us they had fled south before he got to the South China Sea. Following our trip to the South China Sea, President Roosevelt sent the following message to Admiral Nimitz: "The country has followed with personal pride the magnificent sweep of your fleet into enemy waters in addition to the gallant fighting of your flyers, we appreciate the endurance and superb seamanship of your forces. Your fine cooperation with Gen. MacArthur furnishes another example of teamwork and the effective and intelligent use of all weapons. To officers and men of all services who planned and have supplied the needs of the fighting forces through the years is due the credit for the situation which prompted the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy to send this message. To all officers and men, 'Well done'." Formosa and the southern Nansei Shoto were again hit on 21 Jan., and heavy damage was inflicted on aircraft, shipping, docks and the industrial area at Takao. At 1206 hours, the Langley (CVL 27) was hit. A few minutes later, the Ticonderoga (CV 14) was also attacked. 23 Jan. 1945 was an awards day. Presented were: Navy Cross Lt. A. J. FECKE Ens. R. L. BUCHANAN Silver Star Lt. (jg) I. V. SONNER Lt. (jg) R. E. MURRAY Gold Star in Lieu of Second DFC Lt. B. D. JAQUES Distinguished Flying Cross Lt. M. G. BARNES Lt. B. D. JAQUES Ens. F. W. TROUP Lt. U. L. FRETWELL Ens. R. J. MAGHAN Ens. J. B. VAN FLEET Lt. H. W. BALSIGER Ens. R. E. MURRAY Ens. F. A. WIER Bronze Star Ens. E. F. DeVINE Gold Star in Lieu of 2nd Air Medal Lt. A. J. FECKE Lt. E. VAN VRANKEN Ens. M. COZZENS Air Medal Lt. M. G. BARNES Lt. P. E. GREENLEE Lt. (jg) J. L. CHANDLER Ens. B. D. COMBS Ens. R. L. BERTELSON Lt. A. J. FECKE Lt. B. D. JAQUES Lt. (jg) J. R. HERB Ens. M. COZZENS Lt. U. L. FRETWELL Lt. E. VAN VRANKEN Ens. H. W. BALISIGER Ens. B. DUNN On January 1945 the following awards were presented: ~ 71 ~ Navy Cross Lt. Wm. ANDERSON ChBosn. Paul L. BOWEN Silver Star Cmdr. David WELSH Cmdr. A. L. GURNEY Lt. Leonard LEVISON Gunnery Sgt. Peter DeMARIA Grady CAMPBELL GM3c Air Medal Cmdr. David WELSH Presidential Unit Citation Edward VAN BRUNT CAerM On 26 Jan. 1945, the Cabot was anchored at Ulithi Atoll. On 5 Feb. more Awards were presented as follows: Legion of Merit Lt. Cmdr. W. E. EDER Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) Lt. Cmdr. I. E. McPHERSON Lt. (jg) C. S. NORTON Lt. (jg) J. P. SPEIDEL Gold Star in Lieu of 2nd Bronze Star Lt. R. WERRENRATH Bronze Star Cmdr. A. L. GURNEY Lt. Cmdr. A. D. MASTERS Air Medal Cmdr. David J. WELSH Lt. Cmdr. W. E. EDER Commendation Letter with Ribbon Maj. E. J. JOHNSON Lt. P. J. MUELLER Lt. R. A. NEWCOMB Lt. J. M. WOSIK 1st. Lt. R. M. ERVIN Lt. (jg) H. R. ROOME Lt. (jg) W. G. PARKER Lt. (jg) D. L. MacDONALD Distinguished FIying Cross Lt. (jg) Howard H. SKIDMORE Lt. (jg) Stanley TINSLEY Bronze Star Cmdr. D. B. CANDLER Cmdr. Herman SCARNEY Lt. Cmdr. Frank ZIMANSKI Lt. Cmdr. Malcolm QUIGLEY Lt. Paul ASHLEY Lt. Guy BRANAMAN Jr. Lt. Sterling WRIGHT Lt. (jg) Burton ANDERSON Lt. (jg) Earl HOEY Lt. (jg) Jay SOREY Ens. Robert HASS ChGun John CARROLL Jr. Harry MOHLER, CEM Veryl TAYLOR, CSF Clarence HARRISON, Cox Louis SCHMIDHEISER, QM3c Charles DEVANEY, AMM3c John O'DONOVAN, PhM3c Henry NEUMEISTER, Slc John WIGMORE, Slc Commandation Letter with Ribbon Ens. R. E. HUFFMAN Ens. R. D. EDWARDS ChCarp M. D. LOWE F. K. FARMER, CFC E. J. SHANKS, CGM G. S. FRY, ACMM E. S. SHERWOOD, CWT C. A. RUSSELL, CPhM H. D. GINNIS, AOM3c J. H. SIMPSON, AOMlc P. F. WARREN, CMlc R. J. HENRY, AMM2c J. R. BARBER, AMM2c H. J. SCHNEIDER, CM2c F. KLAPPATOSK, Cpl. J. R. PITTMAN, AMM3c W. W. LITCHEGER, AOM3c W. F. KINGSTON, SF3c R. T. BROGDEN, Slc ~ 72 ~ C. H. DECKER, Slc W. R. MURPHY, Slc R. A. SHARPE, Slc J. L. SULLIVAN, Slc Pfc. R. J. CASTIAUX Pfc. J. G. COLE Pfc. J. GRANGER Pfc. G. A. SMITH The commander of the Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet commended: Cmdr. Alfred GURNEY Lt. Cmdr. Alfred MASTERS Lt. Leonard S. LEVISON While anchored back at Ulithi Atoll, dozens of men were transferred to the Cabot for duty. Some of the names were: Harold L. SUTER, S2c(PhoM), Clarence D. SMITH, F2c(WT), T. FLOOR, Flc(MoMM), Paul L. LASH, S2c(FC), Alexander J. SOMOLI, S2c, Joe SUKLE, S2c(Y) and David AGUILERA, Slc(AMM). While at Ulithi, T. FLOOR injured his left hand between a whaleboat and the side of an LCI in line of duty. He was admitted to sick bay. Ens. Philip S. MORAN and his crewmen Kenneth C. ROUND, AMM3c and James SMITH, AMM3c, reported on board for duty. Leonard JACOBS, AM2c transferred off ship to the Naval Air Station at Chicago. Arthur SPOONER, WT3c transferred to San Francisco for instruction. Ens. Lyle A ZEMANEK came on duty aboard for aviation duty. On 6 Feb., Capt. Walton W. SMITH, USN relieved Capt. S. J. MICHAEL as commanding officer. Now Commodore MICHAEL was to become the commanding officer of the Naval Air Station at Alameda, Calif. (When the Cabot returned to the U.S. in April, the commodore greeted his men at the base.) During this period, the ship's log reads: "5 Feb. 1945-Ulithi "Came on board to join VT 29: Lt. (jg) Robert E. MAHONEY, James F. THOMPSON, ARM3c Charles H. PLOTEZYK, AMM3c, John E. KELLY, AMM2c, Robert URBANSKI, ARM3c. "8 Feb. "Julian MILLER, S2c transferred to West Coast of USA. "9 Feb. "Machinist Edward F. BERRY was detached and was to proceed to West Coast of USA. "10 Feb. "Lt. Cmdr. R. A. ZIMANSKI, USN detached and awaiting further orders from BuPres." [map]
Track Chart of Action 12-19 Dec. 1944. ~ 73 ~ [map]
Track Chart of the Third Fleet in the South China Sea. ~ 74 ~ (end chapter 8) ================ . CHAPTER NINE ERNIE PYLE'S FIXIT and STRIKES ON JAPAN February-March 1945 On 9 Feb., Ernie PYLE, A-14 reported on board to gather news by authorization of the 1st Carrier Task Force, Pacific Fleet. PYLE's two weeks aboard was indeed among the highlights of the Cabot's history. Hundreds of newspapers from coast to coast carried his columns, this time dealing with life on a "flattop". The Cabot would have become more famous had it not been for wartime security. The Navy would not let PYLE name the carrier or use the names of the crew at first, but PYLE raised such a fuss that he was allowed to use names and hometowns of the men. However, "Iron Woman" was all that would pass the censors in identifying the ship. PYLE had a low-key style which made him popular worldwide. He discussed the day-to- day life and thoughts of the enlisted men as well as officers. He wrote about a dozen columns while on the Cabot, and many mothers were thrilled when their son's name were mentioned in the articles. Having left Europe in August 1944, PYLE was physically and mentally exhausted. He decided he was through writing from the Front, but the Navy put such pressure on him to go to the Pacific that he finally gave in and was flown to Guam. There, the Navy treated PYLE like a prima donna, and his columns lost their friendly style for a time. PYLE asked to board a fast carrier on the first Tokyo strike and was assigned to the Cabot. Of course we would like to think he picked our carrier because of its outstanding war record, but this wasn't so. However, he did request a small carrier so he could get better acquainted with the crew. On 10 Feb., the Cabot was with Task Group 58.4, headed for Tokyo when Lt. (jg) J. B. VAN FLEET crashed on takeoff in his Hellcat. He was rescued by the USS Franks (DD 554), and this was described in one of PYLE's columns. Ernie PYLE scratched his shortest war "story" on a Zippo lighter enroute to Tokyo. The scuttlebutt from the galley to bridge was that something big was coming. A halt hour before the operation orders were ~ 75 ~ to be opened, a young officer pumped PYLE to find out where the ship was going. PYLE wasn't talking, but he asked the officer for his Zippo lighter. "Stick this in your pocket," PYLE said, "and promise not to look until the orders are opened." With the first blast of the boatswain's pipe, the young officer took the Zippo from his pocket. Scratched on the bottom was the word, "Tokyo". The first all-out carrier assault on the Japanese homeland was to begin. On 16 Feb., the fleet was speeding at 23 knots for the war's first naval strike on Tokyo. Carrier aircraft of the 5th Fleet attacked the city exactly one year after the first carrier strike on Truk. Fleet Admiral Nimitz's communique announced the strike, stating, "This operation has long been planned, and the opportunity to accomplish it fulfills the deeply cherished desire to every officer and man in the Pacific Fleet." During the strike an F6F, piloted by Ens. R. L. BUCHANAN of Clemanton, N.J., developed engine trouble and was forced to make a water landing north of O Shima just outside Yokohama. Members of his flight, led by Lt. FECKE, stayed overhead for an hour and a half. They contacted a rescue submarine, the Pomfret (SS 391) and furnished air cover as she proceeded to rescue BUCHANAN. Visibility was very poor, and sight contact was being maintained only by the pilot's reflector mirror. The sub passed within three miles of O Shima on Tokyo Bay, but was not attacked. As fuel ran low, Lt. FECKE sent the fighters home one by one, but he hung on. BUCHANAN was rescued in good condition and returned to the Cabot later. TG 58.4, under the command of Admiral Radford included fast carriers Cabot, Langley, Yorktown, and the newly arrived Randolph. Lt. John MONSARRAT was the Flight Director Officer on the Langley and he writes in his book Angel on the Yardarm: "Our main assignment during the operation was to hit Tokyo and its nearby airfields, in order to prevent the Japanese from sending raids from Honshu down to Iwo Jima to attack our landing forces. While we were to strike Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima as part of the prelanding bombardment, this time the provision of air support to the Marines, once landed, was to be left mainly to the escort carriers accompanying the transports...." "No Navy planes had yet struck Tokyo, although the Army Air Force had begun to hit it with B-29s from Guam and Saipan...the enemy sent large numbers of fighters to in- tercept our strike planes but, probably because of the very bad weather, did not mount retaliatory strikes against the car- riers so very close to the shore of Honshu.... "For three days after the landings, we augmented the air support the CVEs were providing the troops, and each night retired a little farther from the island to ward off enemy air attacks. When they came, with great pyrotechnics the 'lamplighters' dropped bright magnesium flares on the western side of the carrier force. "Then, for the first time in our experience, the Japanese made good use of 'window'-small strips of metal foil cut to match the wave lengths of our radar and dropped in bundles just to the east of our ships. When the strips fanned out in the air and slowly floated down, their radar echos were so strong that they blocked out our radar vision in that particular sector. Thus, with our ships brilliantly silhouetted against the flares and float planes to the west, and our radars blind to the east, the enemy torpedo planes had a golden opportunity to hit us with devastating effect. For some reason they did not take it...Closer to the island, they did press home their attacks on our ships. We had lent the Saratoga to cover those forces with her night fighters. One night, she took no less than five bomb and torpedo hits. She survived, but limped away, never to return". Since the Iwo Jima landing was set for 19 Feb., this attack on Tokyo was to give strategic ~ 76 ~ cover by destroying air forces and bringing to the Japanese homefront an awareness of the war's progress. Against a loss of 49 planes, 322 enemy aircraft were shot down and 177 destroyed on the ground. After the strike, the fast carriers returned toward Iwo Jima to give direct support for the landings. At 1107 hours 23 Feb., Ernie PYLE left the ship. Less than two months later, 18 April, on Ie Shima west of Okinawa, he was killed by a shot from a Japanese machine gun as he raised his head from a ditch after jumping from a Jeep to take cover. A marker was placed there which reads, "At this spot, the 77th Infantry Division lost a buddy, Ernie PYLE, 18 April 1945." (A book, The Last Chapter by Ernie Pyle, contains a chapter, "Life on a Flat Top" which is about the Cabot. It is particularly interesting reading for anyone connected with the carrier.) On 25 Feb., the Cabot and the fleet hit Tokyo again. A VF 13 piloted by Ens. J. P. CRAWFORD, failed to return from a sweep. The carrier anchored back in Ulithi on 1 March. While in Ulithi for two weeks, many men and officers were transferred off ship and dozens more reported for duty. Lt. Cmdr. Charlie N. "Tex" CONASTER became the new air officer. He was a survivor of the Yorktown (CV 5) that was sunk in the Battle of Midway in 1942. Also reporting aboard were Ens. William J. WALKER and Lt. (jg) John R. HERB, a replacement pilot for Air Group 29. Dwight E. WARD, MoMMlc and William T. GODFREY, RDM2c(T) were transferred to the West Coast. On 8 March, Lt. (jg) Harry A FIFIELD, ChC USNR reported on board as relief for Lt. Cmdr. Roderic L. SMITH, ChC, USNR. The crew welcomed the new "padre" and gave Lt. Cmdr. SMITH a rousing sendoff. The evening of 11 March, the Cabot was anchored and a movie was being shown on the hangar deck. George N. DeLANGE, ACOM was on the flight deck when he saw a low-flying twin-engine plane with the "meat ball" insignia. It dove into the USS Randolph (CV 15), ~ 77 ~ was hit by AA fire and was seen to disintegrate and crash over Miyazaki Air Field, Kyushu on 18 March. The task group steamed northeast during the night, arriving off Shokoku the morning of 19 March. In the few hours before dawn, flares could be seen on the horizon. The enemy knew how to make flares, and if you have ever seen a Japanese flare, you won't forget it. They hang there in the sky as if hooked to a cloud, and they brighten up a vast area of the water. The cry of the director officers and the gun captains was, "Keep your eyes off that flare: Keep a sharp lookout in your own sector." Night vision is immediately impaired - if not ruined - by flares. At 0710 hours, a report was received that the Franklin (CV 13) had been severely damaged by air attacks. Radio indicated many casualties, and at times, reports were conflicting, leading the task group to believe she was being abandoned. Franklin could be seen on the horizon with billows of smoke pouring out. Two bombs reduced the Franklin to a burning hulk. A total of 832 crewmen were killed in what was the second worst disaster in U.S. naval history. She later claimed to have the most decorated crew in the Navy with two Congressional Medals of Honor (one for the chaplain), 19 Navy Crosses and 22 Silver Stars. All were awarded for this action alone. The Cabot's gunners sighted a plane off the horizon at about 0740 hours. It looked like a friendly fighter, since enemy fighters usually traveled in pairs. A vapor trail could be seen, indicating the plane was climbing very high. It was first reported by the forward quad mount when it was sighted, and they tracked the target as it appeared through breaks in the clouds. One of the gun crew reported the plane had entered a cloud on the Cabot's port quarter. That fact was reported, and the quad trained on the cloud. When it reappeared, the director officer of the forward quad ordered the plane to be tracked. The mount was powerless due to short circuits caused by seas breaking over the bow earlier, but they trained manually. The gun was made ready to fire, and the pointer had his foot ready to press the trigger. The pointer, trainer, gun captain and director officer watched the plane, still sure he was enemy. Suddenly, someone yelled, "He's diving for the Essex!" Before the first salvo had reached the target, the entire port battery of the Cabot blazed away at the plane, and then every other gun that could bear commenced firing. The plane dropped a bomb, narrowly missing the flight deck, and splashed into the water off the starboard bow. The pilot then appeared to be pulling out of the dive, but the Essex's gunfire, aided by the Cabot and probably others, did the job. The Japanese rolled and spun into the water off the Essex's port bow. No sooner had the plane splashed, when another was reported diving on the Essex. She was on the port quarter of the Cabot at the time, and the plane dove from her starboard quarter, headed toward the island. The Cabot opened fire when the target came in range and ceased fire in time to prevent stray shots from hitting the Essex. A bomb splashed short of the mark, sending up a big column of water close to the starboard bow. The plane looked as if it would surely hit the flight deck, but it twisted crazily and crashed into the water on the port bow of the Essex. At 1300 hours, two more planes approached: one was shot down by the disposition before it would dive. The second plane had four Corsairs (F4Us) in pursuit, so the order was given to hold fire. The plane, a Zeke, came out of the clouds in a tight turn with the division of Corsairs right behind. The nearest plane to the enemy gave a signal, and the other three broke off and waited. The Zeke took a dive towards the water, but could not shake the pursuer. As he pulled up again, a burst of tracers spurted forth: the Japanese seemed to have been grabbed by an unseen hand and cast into the sea. The strikes sent in on Kure Harbor were very successful. Bomb hits were scored on Kongo - and Yamato - class battleships and damage was done to a Hayataka - class carrier and cruiser in ~ 78 ~ strafing runs. Besides the damage to shipping, docks were strafed and set fire, and a few small craft were damaged. (NOTE: The Kongo battleship had been sunk earlier, so identification was wrong. This must have been the Haruna, a sister ship. The Hayataka carrier, known as the Junyo, survived the war.) Patrols were thick in the air to splash any kamikazes. In early morning, a Myrt was chas- ed, but the fighters could not catch it. They jettisoned their belly tanks, but the Myrt outran them. On returning, the pilots reported that they were at high altitude, making a ground speed of at least 400 knots, but still the plane opened on them and got away. That afternoon, Task Group 58.2 was under attack by 15 to 20 planes. Although they were only 15 miles from this group, none of the attackers came through. The AA barrage could be seen clearly on radar and was reported by some ships as "window". About a half hour before midnight, enemy planes approached, dropping "window" for 60 miles all the way. The screen of the disposition opened fire and downed a plane, tentatively identified as a Judy. Flares were dropped over the formation, but no ships were damaged. TG 58.3 was steaming east of Okinawa on 21 March. That afternoon, a large raid was picked up on radar. All carriers were ordered to launch fighter scrambles to reinforce aerial patrols. A half hour later, planes from TG 58.1 made a tallyho, reporting 21 bombers and 12 fighters splashed with the loss of just two of our fighters. After planes were moved forward to make room for further recoveries, a fighter came in low, hit the ramp and sheared off the arresting hook. He then bounced over the barriers, crashing into parked aircraft. One pilot was killed in a parked plane. The pilot of the crashing plane, however, was not injured. Six fighters were so badly damaged they had to be jettisoned. Killed was Lt. (jg) Irl V. SONNER. His body was committed to the deep on 22 March at latitude 22° 29.5" north, longitude 133° 13.7" east. On 25 March, Ens. Herbert A. GIDNEY Jr. and crewmen Norman J. SUKOLOW, ARM3c and Winfred J. BOND, ARM3c were forced to abandon their Avenger due to engine failure, but were returned to ship on 26 March. That afternoon, Task Force 58 was reorganized with damaged carriers assigned to TG 58.2. Task Group S8.3 then consisted of five carriers, the Essex, Bunker Hill, Hancock, Bataan and Cabot, Battleship Division, Cruiser Division 17 the Indianapolis, Des Ron 62, DesRon 48, less the Abbot. The North Carolina was absent on detached duty. It was perhaps the largest task group of a fast carrier task force ever formed under one direct tactical command. Later, all hands aboard were thrilled when told of the prospect of returning home. The Cabot had not seen the States since 1 Nov. 1943, and had not seen civilization since March 1944 when she was at Pearl Harbor. This was the first news that she would be going home soon. She had fought long, hard and dangerously, gaining the confidence and good wishes of the whole fleet. The next day, the South Dakota, Washington and Indianapolis left the disposition with Destroyer Division 96 to bombard targets on Okinawa. Carriers launched strikes against enemy gun emplacements, barracks, air strips and pillboxes. The Task Force continued poun- ding Okinawa and softening up operations to clear the island for landings planned 1 April. ~ 79 ~ [picture]
Ernie Pyle ~ 80 ~ [map and sketch]
~ 81 ~ [map and sketch]
~ 82 ~ (end of chapter 9)